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The paper applies the collective model to the analysis of intra-household inequality using self-
reported income scales and provides a test for its assumptions. We assume a correspondence 
between the income level that household members report and their true income sharing. Using 
Russian data, we first show that this assumption is supported by the data, and then use couples 
who report the same level of income to identify the full sharing rule for the whole sample. 
From simulations for an average couple living in the Urals, we find that a full income share of 
45% is allocated to the wife.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
One central issue in applications of the economics of the household to policy analysis 
is that of within-household welfare comparisons and, in particular, of intra-family inequality. 
The current article examines this issue in the framework of a collective model of household 
behavior.  
We provide an application of the collective model to the analysis of intra-household 
inequality, using self-reported income scales. The collective model based on the sharing rule 
(Chiappori, 1988, 1992 and 1997, Apps and Rees, 1997)) is used to determine empirically the 
intra-household allocation of resources formally represented by the sharing rule. Most of 
empirical applications are limited to identify the sharing rule up to a constant. This constraint 
comes from the non observation of the private consumption. We propose to use self-reported 
income scale as an additional source of identification allowing the full sharing rule retrieval. 
. We interpret intra-household equality as the equal
4
 distribution of self-reported full 
income between the (main two adult) members of the household. Following recent models by 
Apps and Rees (1997), Chiappori (1997), Rapoport, Sofer and Solaz (2003 and 2006), and 
Bourguignon and Chiuri (2005), not only labor and non-labor income but also the output of 
household production are included in the household resources to be shared. We consider that 
such an approach better reflects the true consumption of leisure by both members of the 
household than that found in more standard collective models.  
Using the framework of the collective model including household production under 
the assumption of marketable domestic goods (Rapoport, Sofer and Solaz, 2003 and 2006), 
we make a number of assumptions linking self-reported income and the theoretical results of 
the model. More precisely, we assume that the answers to a question in the data about self-
                                               
4
Taking into account potential measurement error 
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reported income reflect the true division of income within the family. This assumption is 
tested and we show that it is not refuted by the data. Then from the results obtained for the 
sub-sample of couples reporting the same level of income, we calculate the constant of the 
sharing rule for the whole sample: we thus propose a new method for deriving not only the 
derivatives, but also the sharing rule itself (see Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel, 2004). 
In recent years a large number of empirical papers have analyzed self-reported income 
and poverty (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters, 2004). In this paper we assume that the main 
reason why two members of the same family report different incomes is that they do actually 
end up with unequal incomes as a result of household income-sharing. Empirically, and as 
predicted by non-unitary models (bargaining as well as collective models), in the RLMS 
survey data many husbands and wives report different values of income. 
 
After briefly presenting the collective model with household production, and setting 
out the predicted relationship between the sharing rule from the collective model and self-
reported income data, we show that the values of the latter reported by husbands and wives 
are significantly different. The data come from the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey 
(RLMS, Rounds V to VIII, 1994-1998). We test a number of alternative explanations of these 
discrepancies, and conclude that the data provide support to our hypothesis that differences in 
these subjective responses reflect real differences in income sharing. More specifically, we 
estimate an ordered probit model in order to explain the differences in husbands’ and wives’ 
answers. This estimation is based on the collective model with household production; as such 
we have to take into account the endogenous profit from household production. We estimate 
the model using full information maximum likelihood (FIML) and find, as expected, that the 
more “bargaining power” a woman has (as measured by her wage relative to her husband’s, 
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for example), the more likely she is to self-report a level of income higher than that reported 
by her husband. These results provide an original test of the collective model. 
In a second stage, we estimate the total labor supplies of household members (market 
work plus domestic work) using 3SLS. We first use the sub-sample of households who report 
equal income-sharing to derive the labor supply parameters. The parameters of the sharing 
rule are then identified in a second stage using the whole sample. We are thus able to 
calculate the marginal effects of wages and non-labor income on the sharing rule: these show, 
in particular, that the female income share is more sensitive to female wages than to male 
wages. The full identification of the sharing rule allows simulating full income-sharing. For 
an average couple, with the husband aged 41, with one child, and living in the Urals, we find 
that a full income share of 45% is allocated to the wife.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 outlines the collective model of 
household labor supply with household production, based upon Rapoport, Sofer and Solaz 
(2003 and 2006). We then apply this model to intra-household inequality and provide a test of 
its main assumptions. Section 2 presents the data. In section 3, we present the method used to 
fully identify the sharing rule. Section 4 presents the results.  
 
1. THE MODEL 
In this section we derive conditions for the equal sharing of full income, starting from 
the collective model including household production (Apps and Rees, 1997, Rapoport, Sofer 
and Solaz, 2003 and 2006). Rapoport et al. propose a method for estimating the derivatives of 
the sharing rule under the assumption of marketable domestic goods. We extend these results 
to provide a method which allows the identification of the sharing rule itself. 
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1.1. The Collective Model with Household Production. 
Consider two individuals (i = f,m). Each has a utility function depending on leisure 
(assignable and observed), L
i
, the consumption of a Hicksian composite good (unobserved), 
C
i
, with a normalized price of 1, and a vector of domestic goods Y. 
Besides the composite good, C
i
, purchased in the market, the household produces the 
vector of domestic goods, Y. Let the production function of the k
th
 domestic good
5
 be 
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where t
k
i
, (i=f, m) is member i’s household work devoted to the production of domestic good 
k, and z is an N-vector representing household heterogeneity. We assume that all goods are 
privately consumed. Individual utility can be written as: );,,( zY
iiiii
CLUU = , where Y
i
 is the 
vector of member i’s consumption of domestic goods. 
Let t
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∑
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i
t
 (i = f, m) be the total time that household member i devotes to the 
production of domestic goods, and T the total time available. Let s be an R-vector of 
distribution factors
6
, y the household’s non-labor income, and w
f
, and w
m
 the wage rate of f 
and m respectively. 
 1.1.1. The Household Maximization Problem. 
In the collective model with household production, the Pareto-efficient solution results 
from program (P1): 
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 We assume that there is no joint production in the household production sector. 
6
 Distribution factors are variables which influence the bargaining power of household members, but neither 
prices nor preferences, (see Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix, 2002).  
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subject to            (P1) 
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where ),,,,( zsyww
mfii
µµ =  are continuously differentiable weighting factors contained in 
[0, 1] such that 1=+
mf
µµ  with s being a vector of distribution factors7. ),,( p
mf
wwΠ  is the 
profit from household production. Assume that domestic goods are marketable: they have 
market substitutes and can be freely exchanged in the market. The price vector of domestic 
goods p is thus exogenous and the same for all households. Also note that, as household 
production can be bought or sold in the market, the total consumption of household goods by 
household members does not necessarily sums up to total household production   
 1.1.2. Decentralization and the Sharing Rule. 
As in Apps and Rees (1997) and Chiappori (1997), the second theorem of welfare 
economics implies that the equilibrium corresponding to program (P1) can be decentralized 
and the solution obtained in two stages. 
First, the household determines the optimal allocation of time of each member in 
domestic production, using the criterion of the maximization of profit or net value of domestic 
production. This imputed profit is added to the other income flows. In the second stage, 
consumption is decentralized by the appropriate choice of shares Φ
i
 (i = f, m) of total full 
income. Program (P1) can thus be reformulated as (P2.1) and (P2.2): 
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 Distribution factors are variables which influence the bargaining power of household members, but neither 
prices nor preferences, (see Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix, 2002).  
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subject to budget and time constraints:                (P2.2) 
iiiii
wLC Φ≤++ pY  
L
i
 + h
i
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i
 = T,  
where the sharing rule Φ
i
),;,,,( zsp yww
mf
represents the part of full income allocated to 
member i, with:  
Φ = Φ
f +
 Φ
m
 = (w
f
 + w
m
)T + y + Π  
 
 
 1.1.3. The Demands for Leisure. 
Solving program (P3) below, which is a reformulation of (P2), yields the Marshallian 
demands (1.2) and (1.3) for leisure. We have: 
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L
f
 and L
m
 are the Marshallian demands for leisure. As the price vector p is fixed, it is 
omitted from the endogenous functions of the model. 
1.2. Intra-household Income Comparisons. 
 1.2.1. Intra-household Equality and the Sharing Rule. 
Intra-household equality can be defined in a number of different ways. Assuming 
inter-personal utility comparisons, for example, we can consider the equality of utility 
between the two household members. In this paper we interpret intra-household equality as an 
equal distribution of the total household income defined by the collective model as the sum of 
monetary and non-monetary incomes (leisure being valued at the opportunity cost of work). 
We use data which contain the answer to a subjective question about income. 
Respondents situate their income on a 9-step ladder. Making the usual assumption of no 
systematic bias in these replies, we directly relate their subjective answer to the income they 
objectively receive within the family. The assumption made here is that people’s answers to 
this question provide information about the income share allocated to them within the 
household. We will discuss this assumption in depth in the next section. Assume for the time 
being that intra-household equality is defined as equality in the sharing of full income, which 
in turn is indicated by both husband and wife giving the same answer to the income question
8
. 
More precisely, we assume that: 
mf
Φ>Φ , if the wife reports a higher value of income than her husband 
mf
Φ<Φ , if she reports a lower value of income than her husband 
mf
Φ=Φ , if husband and wife report the same level of income. 
                                               
8
 The definiton we use for equality in the empirical work is slightly more complicated, as it allows for 
measurement errors; see section 2 below. 
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The definitions of 
f
Φ  and 
m
Φ  yield the following system describing intra-household 
inequality: 
f
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2. DO SUBJECTIVE ANSWERS REFLECT TRUE INCOME-
SHARING? 
In this section, we provide more details about the assumptions that we make. We first 
present the data, and then concentrate on the answers to the self-reported income question and 
the assumptions we make. In the last paragraph, we carry out some estimations which aim to 
test these assumptions. 
 
2.1 The data 
 The data used in the econometric analysis come from the Russian Longitudinal 
Monitoring Survey (RLMS). This database is jointly collected by UNC Chapel Hill (USA), 
the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Russian Institute of Nutrition. 
The survey has two phases: during the first phase of the project (1992-1994), the 
RLMS collected four rounds (I – IV) of data on 5900 households on average; since 1994 the 
RLMS has collected eight further rounds (V - XII) of data in the second phase of the project. 
Since the RLMS switched partners in Russia for the second phase, the second phase data were 
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drawn anew from the population. The second phase sample size is approximately 4000 
households. The samples in the two phases do not concern the same individuals. 
Two questionnaires are given to survey respondents: a household questionnaire and an 
individual questionnaire. The first asks about household structure, expenditure, income, 
housing conditions, land use, and so on. The second covers employment, labor income, 
educational, satisfaction with economic conditions, etc. The individual questionnaire for 
rounds I – VIII (1992-1998) included a section on "Use of Time", containing questions on the 
amount of time devoted to household occupations in the seven days preceding the interview. 
These occupations are working on the individual land plot, dacha, or garden plot, excluding 
farm plots or a personal subsidiary farm; looking for and purchasing food items; preparing 
food and washing dishes; cleaning the apartment; doing laundry, ironing; looking after the 
children; caring for any (other) children – ones own or others’– aged 12 or under, who don’t 
live with the interviewee and caring for whom is not part of the interviewee’s job; looking 
after one’s father who is aged over 50 (for example, going to the store, helping with cleaning, 
or washing clothes); looking after one’s mother who is aged over 50; and helping relatives or 
acquaintances who are aged over 50.  
 We use data from rounds V– VIII (1994-1998) of phase II as we will need the time use 
questionnaire to include household production in the empirical analysis. The sample used for 
the econometric analysis consists of couples where both partners are employed and the 
household head is of working age. That is, men are between 16 and 59 years old and both 
partners work. This yields an unbalanced panel of 1480 households (household heads) with 
2419 observations, as some households are observed several times. After excluding 
households with missing values on key variables we are left with 2144 observations. Table 1 
reports the percentage of households observed for 1, 2, 3 or 4 waves. More than half of 
households are observed only in one wave, and only 16.8% of households are observed more 
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than twice. Due to the small size of the panel, we pool the data and do not control for any 
invariant household effects in what follows. These effects can produce biases, but given the 
characteristics of the data these are expected to be insignificant. By contrast, we control for 
the period of observation in order to take into account common aggregate time-specific 
shocks due to the instability of the Russian economy during transition, and in particular 
instability in the Russian labor market. 
 
 
Table1. Frequencies of Number of Waves Observed per Household. 
Number of Waves Observed Frequency (%) 
1 55.6 
2 27.6 
3 12.4 
4 4.4 
Total 100 
 
Table 2 shows the sample means of the variables used in the econometric analysis. 
 
Table 2. Sample Means of Variables. 
Women Men  
Variable 
Round VIII 
Means 
Round VII 
Means 
Round VI 
Means 
Round VIII 
Means 
Round VII 
Means 
Round VI 
Means 
Market time per 
week (h
i
), hrs 
38.78 
(15.38) 
38.41 
(14.68) 
39.5 
(12.23) 
44.72 
(17.25) 
44.75 
(16.84) 
45.22 
(12.99) 
Domestic time 
per week (hh
i
), 
hrs 
46.87 
(29.8) 
45 
(30.7) 
42.9 
(30.4) 
14.72 
(16.47) 
15.71 
(19.36) 
13.74 
(17.52) 
Total working 
time per week 
(H
i
), hrs 
85.66 
(31.92) 
83.23 
(31.49) 
82.36 
(31.53) 
59.39 
(22.69) 
60.43 
(24.93) 
58.95 
(22.48) 
Hourly wage 
(w
i
), roubles 
3.87 
(10.9) 
6.12 
(14.5) 
7 
(17) 
7.8 
(45) 
10.46 
(36) 
12.7 
(55.5) 
Household total 
monthly income 
(Y), roubles 
2196 
(14484) 
2696 
(5878) 
2887 
(6145) 
2196 
(14484) 
2696 
(5878) 
2887 
(6145) 
Source: RLMS. (standard errors in parentheses). 
 
The difference in total working time between men and women is particularly striking: 
though women work slightly fewer hours in the market (as is the case in many countries), the 
total amount of domestic work performed by women is substantial, as is the difference 
between men’s and women’s total work hours. 
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2.2 Self-reported income and its interpretation 
 
To measure individual income, we use the following Subjective Economic Ladder 
question from the RLMS: “Please imagine a 9-step ladder where on the bottom, the first step, 
stand the poorest people, and on the highest step, the ninth, stand the rich. On which step are 
you today?" We analyze the intra-family correlation in the answers to this question. Here we 
make the assumption that household members give the same answer to this question if they 
receive the same share (one half) of full household income, which includes monetary (market 
and domestic) as well as non-monetary income.  
 For the descriptive statistics we include all couples in which individuals both gave 
answers to the above question and provided wage information. To analyze self-rated income, 
we collapse the highest ranks (6, 7, 8, and 9) of the ladder into one category: few respondents 
considered themselves as amongst the richest. Table 3 summarizes the distribution of self-
rated economic welfare. The vast majority of individuals feel poor: if we take the poorest two 
rungs to be the subjectively poor, the subjective poverty rate rose from 19.12% in 1994 to 
23.91% in 1998. Most individuals say they are on steps 3, 4 and 5 of the 9-rung ladder.  
 
 
Table 3. Income Levels. 
Economic Ladder Question 
1- the poorest; 6 – the richest 
Round 5 (1994) 
Number (%) 
Round 6 (1995) 
Number (%)  
Round 7 (1996) 
Number (%) 
Round 8 (1998)  
Number (%) 
1 
109 (6.0) 145 (9.1) 72 (6.3) 102 (8.1) 
2 
238 (13.1) 184 (11.6) 147 (12.8) 198 (15.8) 
3 
471 (25.9) 350 (22.0) 266 (23.1) 333 (26.5) 
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4 
462 (25.4) 403 (25.4) 291 (25.3) 309 (24.6) 
5 
404 (22.3) 386 (24.3) 280 (24.3) 243 (19.4) 
6 
131 (7.2) 121 (7.6) 94 (8.2) 70 (5.6) 
Total (individuals) 
1815 (100) 1589 (100) 1150 (100) 1255 (100) 
Source: RLMS (rounds 5-8). 
 
In this paper we are interested in income differences within a given household. Table 4 
presents the differences in the Economic Ladder replies of husbands and wives. We consider 
married household heads, and compare their answer to that of their spouse. In over half of 
households men and women give different answers to the subjective question, as shown in 
Table 4. Almost 18% of men feel one step poorer than their wives and 10% differ by more 
than 2 steps. On average, women report lower incomes than men in the same households: in 
1998, in over 34% of households the wife reports lower income, versus only 28% of 
households in which husbands reported being poorer. Our interpretation of the difference is 
that, as income sharing is the result of a bargaining process, income is not necessarily equally 
shared between husband and wife. This assumption is widely discussed and tested below. 
 
Table 4. Within household discrepancies in self-reported income  
Wife’s score minus  
Husband’s score 
Round 5 (1994) 
Number (%) 
Round 6 (1995) 
Number (%)  
Round 7 1996) 
Number (%) 
Round 8 (1998) 
Number (%) 
-2 
87 (10.8) 61 (9.4) 53 (11.3) 60 (11.8) 
-1 
139 (17.3) 126 (19.4) 101 (21.6) 112 (22.1) 
0 
339 (42.2) 283 (43.5) 188 (40.3) 192 (37.9) 
1 
142 (17.7) 127 (19.5) 80 (17.1) 95 (18.7) 
2 
97 (12.1) 53 (8.1) 45 (9.6) 48 (9.5) 
Total households 
804 (100) 650 (100) 467 (100) 507 (100) 
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Source: RLMS (rounds 5-8). 
0- there is no difference between husband’s and wife’s responses. -1 – the wife is situated one step lower than 
her spouse, -2 –the wife is situated 2 or more steps lower than her spouse. 1- the wife is situated one step higher 
than her spouse, 2 – the wife is situated 2 or more steps higher than her spouse.  
 
We use these income differences to construct an index of intra-household inequality 
for the empirical analysis.  
 
2.3. Are subjective answers reliable? 
We first provide some evidence to support the assumption that subjective data contain 
useful information. Ravallion and Lokshin (2001, 2002), for example, argue that though "the 
welfare inferences drawn from answers to subjective survey questions are clouded by 
concerns about measurement errors and how latent psychological factors influence observed 
respondent characteristics", subjective measures of income and poverty can be used as 
complements to standard socio-economic poverty measures. The use of subjective data, 
launched by the Leyden school in the 1970's for subjective poverty measurement, has 
developed rapidly since the late 1990's (Senik, 2005). Many nationally-representative 
household surveys such as the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), the German Socio-
Economic Panel (GSOEP) or the data used in this paper – the Russian Longitudinal 
Monitoring Survey (RLMS) – contain subjective questions related to general well-being, 
satisfaction with income, job, health and so on, or individuals' attitudes towards variables such 
as inequality or unemployment. These questions are generally used as proxies for welfare and 
well-being. In this reading, individuals themselves define their own level of welfare and 
provide information that would not be otherwise available, at least in large-scale surveys.  
The main justification for the use of subjective data comes from the limitation of the 
axiom of revealed preferences (Senik, 2005). The traditional approaches to individual 
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behavior can be complemented by the use of data on individual perceptions in the cases when 
use of the former is restricted by the presence of externalities, social interactions, and so on. 
For example, subjective information is often used to reveal the non-pecuniary costs of 
unemployment (Clark and Oswald, 1994; Winkelmann and Winkelmann, 1998) and 
individuals' attitudes towards inequality can help to design redistributive policies (Ng, 1996; 
Ravallion and Lokshin, 2000). In general, these analyses provide consistent results that agree 
with our common sense. However, two key assumptions are necessary for the analysis of 
subjective data: that individuals are able to evaluate their own situation, and that responses 
can be compared between individuals (Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2002). The reliability and validity 
of individual answers have been extensively studied in the recent literature (Diener, 1984; 
Diener et al., 1999; Veenhoven, 1993), and Easterlin (2001) has pointed out that "the general 
conclusion of such assessments is that subjective indicators,…, though not perfect, do reflect 
respondents' substantive feelings of well-being". Keeping these reflections in mind, we appeal 
to subjective data in a relatively new sphere: the analysis of intra-household inequality
9
. 
A number of critics have worried about the comparison of income scales: people live 
in different social environments, so their answers about income may merely reflect their 
position relative to their own social environment rather than to a common scale. The 
argument is not totally convincing in our context, as we can assume that two individuals 
living together and sharing, at least partly, their income, have the same scale for self-
positioning on the income ladder. We show below (Table 5) that both spouses have in mind 
an income including within household transfers when answering the question. Thus, for none 
of them would the often quoted reference group of work colleagues, for example, be relevant. 
Instead, here, the relevant reference group would rather be other households they know 
                                               
9
 As far as we know, the only other application of subjective information to intra-household distribution 
of welfare is Bonke and Browning (2003), in which they use a measure of self-perceived economic well-being). 
 
 16 
(which could, of course, include colleagues of both sides). As husbands and wives share a 
similar social environment, they should thus share the same reference points regarding their 
income relative to that of other individuals in households that they know. Such reasoning is 
also supported by the finding of Plug and Van Praag (1998), who report that both adult partners 
appear to answer almost identically to subjective questions of the Leyden-type.  
Another issue is that we may define equal sharing too narrowly. We are aware that 
interpreting small differences in the answers to subjective questions as revealing true 
inequality in income sharing may imply too high a level of confidence in interpersonal 
comparisons of subjective answers. We thus allow for some heterogeneity between partners 
by interpreting a difference of one in replies as indicating no difference in income (one being 
optimistic, the other one pessimistic, for example, or one being in an especially good mood on 
the day of the interview). 
We construct an index which takes the value of 0 if the within household response 
difference equals -2 or less (the wife feels poorer than her husband); 1 if the difference 
between wife’s and husband’s replies is no greater than 1 in absolute value (the two partners 
report more or less the same income); and 2 if the wife reports higher economic welfare than 
her husband (a difference on the scale of at least 2)
10
.  
 A final objection concerns the question asked in the data: “on which step are you 
today?”. Although this is clearly asked on an individual basis within the individual 
questionnaire, it does not explicitly refer to household income-sharing. To test whether 
people, when answering this question, could have in mind their own earnings, rather than 
their share of household full income, we compute the simple correlations shown in table 5 
below. 
                                               
10
We also ran the estimations with equal sharing corresponding to strict equality in the answers. The results were 
very similar. 
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Table 5. Correlations between wages and household members’ replies to the income 
     question 
 Woman’s reply Man’s reply 
w
f
h
f
 0.16 0.12 
w
m
h
m
 0.18 0.23 
 
Table 5 shows that household members clearly refer to a kind of household income,  
i.e. including within household transfers, rather than to their own earnings only when 
answering the income question. Couples agree that their income is more strongly correlated 
with the husband’s labor earnings (which generally contributes a larger share to total 
household monetary income), and more weakly correlated with the wife’s labor earnings (the 
wife’s monetary contribution being generally lower). Also note that, though a higher 
correlation is found for both with the husband’s earnings, the correlation with one own’s 
contribution to earnings is also found higher for both genders, than that given by the spouse 
for his/her spouse’s earnings. This is consistent with our interpretation in terms of a sharing 
rule. If a higher labor income increases my bargaining power, then, if my wage increases, I’ 
shall answer a higher value to the income question, for two reasons: first, because of a 
positive income effect, which exerts the same positive influence upon my spouses’ income, 
and, second, because of a “negotiation effect”, which increases my income share, but, 
conversely, decreases my spouse’s. Because of the negotiation effect, a stronger positive 
correlation is thus expected for each spouse with their own labor income than the correlation 
with the spouse’s labor income found for the opposite gender. 
 
2.4. A test of the collective model  
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 Having assumed that the data provide reliable information on the individual shares of 
full income, 
f
Φ  and 
m
Φ we can directly test the usual assumptions made regarding the 
sharing rule.  
The empirical model describing intra-household inequality (equation 1.4 above), can 
be formulated as an endogenous ordered probit, derived from the sharing rule. As the 
allocation of time is endogenous in this model, introducing household production requires that 
the profit from household production, Π, be endogenized. This is carried out here by adding 
two simultaneous equations of labor supply in domestic production, for husbands and wives. 
Note that, as the sharing rule itself is generally assumed to be a function of monetary 
characteristics (wages and non-labor income), but not directly of non-monetary variables, 
such as household productivity, the theoretical model implies that the only channel between 
the variables of the ordered probit and the two latter equations is via the profit from domestic 
production. 
 The model is estimated by full information maximum likelihood (FIML).  
2.4.1 The econometric model 
Let I be an index function taking values 0, 1 or 2 depending on whether the difference 
observed between female and male levels of income is negative, zero or positive. 
 
 0, if 
mf
Φ<Φ  
I= 1,  if 
mf
Φ=Φ          (2.1) 
 2,  if 
mf
Φ>Φ  
 
Let 
f
Φ * be a criterion function associated with an unobservable sharing rule: 
 
f
Φ * ε+= Zγ ' ,  
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where Z is a vector of household-specific characteristics and distribution factors which are 
assumed to influence the sharing rule. In particular, Z contains the difference in 
wages )(
fm
ww −  and non-labor income y. Note that here household exogenous income y can 
be individualized, which also implies that individual exogenous incomes can be used as 
distribution factors. 
The index function can then be written as: 
 
 0, if 
f
Φ *
1
κ≤ , 
I= 1, if
21
* κκ ≤Φ<
f
,          (2.2) 
 2, if 
f
Φ *
2
κ> , 
 
where k
1
 and k
2
 are unknown parameters to be estimated.  
Recall that the sharing rule 
f
Φ  depends on the profit from domestic production Π, 
which is endogenous as household production depends on the time devoted to household 
work and wage rates. As such, system (2.2) needs to be completed by equations describing 
household work. The resulting system (2.3) is the econometric representation of the 
theoretical model (1.4): 
 
 0, if 
f
Φ *
1
κ≤ , 
I= 1, if 
21
* κκ ≤Φ<
f
, 
 2, if 
f
Φ *
2
κ> ,         (2.3) 
and :  t
f
 = α
f
X
f
 + u
1
 
t
m
 = α
m
X
m
 + u
2 
 
 20 
where α
i
 are the parameter vectors, X
i
 are the vectors of individual i specific characteristics 
and household-specific productivity factors. The error terms 
21
uandu,ε  are assumed to have 
a trivariate standard normal distribution with zero mean and covariance matrix Σ: 
 1 
1
uεσ  
2
uεσ  
Σ =  
1
uεσ  
2
1
σ  
21
uu
σ  
 
2
uεσ  
21
uu
σ  2
2
σ  
 
with 
j
uεσ  = cov ),( juε , j=1, 2, 
21
uu
σ  = cov ),(
21
uu , 
2
1
σ =Var(
1
u ) and 
2
2
σ =Var(
2
u ).  
  
 2.4.2 Maximum Likelihood Estimation 
 The model is estimated by full information maximum likelihood (FIML). This 
estimation method implements the full information ML procedure to estimate simultaneously 
the ordered and continuous parts of the model in order to provide consistent standard errors. 
The likelihood function for the system of equations (2.3) is: 
 
( )( )[ ]∏
=
××−=
0:
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),(,'
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uufuuFL Zγκ
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where i denotes the ith observation, and ( )
ii
uuF
21
,.  is the conditional cumulative distribution 
function of ε  on 
ii
uu
21
, ; ),(
21 ii
uuf  is the bivariate standard normal distribution function. 
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The variable 
21
,uuε  follows a normal distribution. Denoting  
 
=Σ~   2
1
σ  
21
uu
σ  
 
21
uu
σ  2
2
σ  
we can calculate its mean µ and variance σ² as follows (Greene, 2000): 
 
( ) ( )[ ] ( )2
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1////)',(
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21
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where ρ
1
, ρ
2
, and ρ are the coefficients of correlation between ε and u
1
, ε and u
2
, and u
1
 and u
2
 
respectively. 
The log of the likelihood function can be defined in terms of the cumulative standard 
normal distribution as below: 
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with F
0
 standing for the cumulative standard normal distribution function and 
σµ)'( −−=
iij
j
i
kz Zγ , (j=1, 2). 
 
 2.4.3. The results  
The dependent variables are the natural logarithms of male and female monthly 
domestic labor supply in hours, and the index of intra-household inequality. All of the 
independent variables are here assumed to be exogenous. We include the wage rates of both 
husband and wife, individual demographic characteristics (age, age-squared and education), 
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household characteristics (number of children, assets and possession of durables) and type 
and region of settlement. The estimates are reported in Table 6 below.  
Relatively few variables are significantly correlated with domestic labor supply. The 
partner’s wage rate is an important determinant of women’s domestic working time: higher 
male wages are associated with greater domestic labor supply by the wife, while higher 
female wages have no significant effect on males’ domestic work. Other significant variables 
in both equations are the number of young children (0-7 years old) and older children (7-18 
years old) in the household: as expected, more children increase both spouses’ domestic work 
especially when the children are younger. Non labor-market variables are not significant here. 
Living space, durables possession or owning an individual plot do not influence the hours of 
domestic work of either husband or wife. Household work does vary by region and type of 
settlement. Both partners work less in Moscow and St-Petersburg, and in the Urals and 
Eastern and Western Siberia women's domestic labor supply is lower than in the other 
regions. As might be expected, both men and women living in rural areas work more at home 
than do those living in urban areas.  
We have included in the ordered probit equation variables, such as non-labor 
income
11
, which we may expect to be correlated with the spouses’ bargaining power. As 
noted above, this index takes a value of 0 if the within household difference in replies is less 
than or equal to -2 (the wife feels poorer than her husband); 1 if this difference is no greater 
than 1 in absolute value (the two partners thus giving more or less the same answer to the 
income question); and 2 if the wife reports a higher level of income than her husband (with 
the difference on the scale being at least 2). The wage difference in these equations is 
expressed as the natural logarithm of the difference between female and male wages.  
                                               
11
 For each household, the data give information upon the different sources of income. Household non-labor 
income is obtained as the sum of all the different types of non-labor income. 
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Table 6. ML Estimation of Woman and Man's Domestic Labor Supply and the Index of 
       Intra-Household Inequality
a
. 
 
 Woman's 
domestic 
labor supply 
Man's 
domestic 
labor supply 
 
 
Index
a
 
 
Marginal effects for the ordered probit 
 Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient dP(0)/dX3 dP(1)/dX3 dP(2)/dX3 
        
Ln of man's wage rate 0.044*** 0.014 0.1*** 0.0007 -0.00004 -0.0006 
Ln of woman's wage rate -0.006 0.015  -0.002 0.00011 0.002 
Wage difference
b
    0.17*** -0.022 0.0014 0.021 
Man's age  -0.014     
Man's age squared  0.014     
Woman's age 0.025**      
Woman's age squared  -0.026***      
Age difference
c
   -0.013** 0.002 -0.0001 -0.002 
Woman has technical or higher education  -0.032      
Man has technical or higher education  0.054     
Male education (years)   -0.01 0.00004 -0.000003 -0.00003 
Woman has higher degree of education than man   0.06 -0.015 0.03 -0.015 
Household non-labor income   -0.0002 -0.003 -0.0002 0.003 
Number of children 0-7 years old 0.44*** 0.455*** 0.017 -0.011 -0.0007 0.01 
Number of children 7-18 years old 0.19*** 0.171*** 0.06* -0.014 0.0008 0.013 
Number of elderly persons in the household  0.021 0.121** 0.08 0.007 0.0004 -0.006 
Ln of living space (sq. meters) -0.020 -0.063 -0.04 0.004 -0.0002 -0.003 
Automobile owned 0.024 -0.053     
Washing machine owned -0.030 0.003     
Family is working on an individual plot  0.016 0.015 -0.02 0.004 -0.009 0.004 
Rural 0.146** 0.22***     
North Caucasian -0.030 0.03     
Volga-Vaytski and Volga Basin -0.034 0.010     
Moscow - St-Petersburg -0.09* -0.16** -0.02 -0.004 -0.008 0.004 
Northern and North Western -0.072 0.135     
The Urals -0.184** -0.06     
Western Siberia -0.108* 0.01     
Eastern Siberia and Far Eastern  -0.15*** 0.034     
Round 5  0.075* 0.162** 0.09 -0.02 0.04 -0.02 
Round 6 0.006 0.019 0.044 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 
Round 8 -0.06 -0.062 0.025 -0.006 0.011 -0.006 
Constant  4.21*** 3.82***     
Ancillary parameters       
k
1
   -1.2***    
k
2
   1.34***    
ρ
1
 (correlation between woman's domestic labor 
supply and the sharing rule) 
 -0.06*     
ρ
2
 (correlation between man's domestic labor 
supply and the sharing rule) 
 -0.03     
ρ (correlation between man's and woman's supply)  0.27***     
σ
1
  0.615***     
σ
2
  0.985***     
Number of observations  1916     
Log likelihood   -6462.59     
* significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level 
a
 The dependent variable is the index of intra household inequality: 0 – the wife reports being  
poorer than her husband; 1 – there is no difference, 2 – the wife reports being richer than her husband. 
b
 Wage difference: the difference between ln of woman's real wage rate and ln of man's real wage rate. 
c
 Age difference: the difference between woman's age and man's age 
The reference categories are: Urban versus Rural, Central and Central Black-Earth for region, Round 7 for wave.  
Source: RLMS (rounds 5-8)
 
 
 24 
The results in Table 6 are in line with those predicted by the theory: the wage 
difference is highly significant with the "correct" sign.  
We thus find, as expected, that the higher is the woman's wage compared to her 
husband’s, the greater is the probability that the woman's response to the income question is 
higher than her husband’s. This conclusion is confirmed by the marginal effects analysis in 
the right-hand panel of Table 6. The marginal effects are almost the same in absolute value for 
the first and third categories of the dependent variable, so the result is symmetric. The wage 
ratio is therefore a powerful determinant of the outcome of intra-household bargaining. 
Another variable which influences the distribution of full income among household members 
is the age difference, here the wife's age minus her husband's age. The estimated coefficient 
on this variable is negative and significant: the older the woman is relative to her husband, the 
lower the probability of the woman's higher response. The effect of the age difference can be 
interpreted as showing the greater bargaining power of women who are relatively younger 
compared to their husband. On the other hand, we find no significant effect of the difference 
in partners’ education levels on the distribution of income within the household.  
These results are in accordance with the collective model predictions and strongly 
support the assumption made throughout the paper that the answers given to the income 
question do correspond to individual income shares, which themselves are the result of a 
bargaining process. Note that in the case of the unitary model of household behaviour, the 
total individual income of each partner would be the same and the discrepancies in self 
reported levels would be random and thus not related to the wages or to age differences as it is 
found here. 
The correlations between domestic labor supplies and the sharing rule are low (see 
Table A1 in the Appendix for the values of ρ
1
 and ρ
2
). This result provides some support for 
our further assumption that the surplus from domestic production (profit Π in the theoretical 
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model) is negligible compared to other sources of household income. This is equivalent to 
assuming that household production is evaluated at its market price, i.e. using the level of 
wages.  
The results of our estimation show that the wage and age differentials are important 
determinants of intra-household inequality. These results support the choice of the collective 
model to analyze the intra-household allocation of income. 
We now turn to the second main objective of the paper, namely the identification of 
the sharing rule. 
 
3. IDENTIFYING THE SHARING RULE: A NEW METHOD 
 
Rapoport, Sofer and Solaz (2003) show that, if the allocations of household members’ 
time between domestic work, market work and leisure are observable, and if there exists at 
least one observable distribution factor, then the sharing rule can be recovered up to a 
constant.  
Here, additional information on the income levels of household members provides us 
with a supplementary constraint allowing to completely identifying the sharing rule. 
The derivatives of the sharing rule can be computed using the estimated parameters of 
the simultaneous estimation of total labor supply (market plus domestic work):  
 
H
f
 = β
f
Q + v
1 
         (3.1) 
H
m
 = β
m
Q + v
2
 
with H
i
 = h
i 
+ t
i
, i = f,m 
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where β
i
 are the parameter vectors, Q ),,,,,( zs
mfmf
yyww=  is a vector whose components 
are the individuals’ specific characteristics and household-specific distribution factors, and v
1
 
and v
2
 are distributed bivariate normally. We call this result R1 
The next step is to identify the constant of the sharing rule, as well as its derivatives
12
. 
To do this, assume that Π is observable (which is not the case), 
f
Φ ),,,,,( zs
mfmf
yyww  can 
be recovered from the sample of households who share full income (approximately) equally. 
For this sample, we have:  
f
Φ  = 
m
Φ  = [ ]Π+++ yTww
fm
)(
2
1
       (3.2) 
Unfortunately, Π never can be observed. We thus assume in addition that, empirically, 
the surplus from domestic production is negligible compared to other sources of household 
income. This is equivalent to assuming that household production is evaluated at its market 
costs, i.e. wages.  
The empirical justification for this assumption is the low values found for the 
correlations between domestic labor supply and the sharing rule equations (ρ
1
 and ρ
2
 in 
equations (2.3) above). The correlation between men’s hours of domestic work and the index 
of intra-household inequality is negative, small (-0.03) and insignificant. For women, the 
correlation is also small, negative (-0.06) but significant at the 10% level. As, for households 
where both members participate in the labor market, Π is the only channel in the theoretical 
model through which domestic work and the sharing rule could be correlated, these findings 
support the assumption that we make above. 
Here, we propose a direct identification method, based on the additional condition 
provided by the index of intra-household equality. For this, we use a  two-stage estimation. 
                                               
12
 Note that Rapoport, Solaz and Sofer, 2005, gives a method for estimating the derivatives of the sharing rule 
when a significant distribution factor exists.  
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3.1 A Two-stage estimation approach 
In theory, the estimation of the total labor supplies of the two household members on 
the sub-sample of the couples for whom full income shares are fully “observed” should allow 
us to identify the individual shares of full income for the rest of the sample. One problem, we 
face, though, is that of over-identification: the estimates of individual full income shares 
should sum up to the (observed) full income, which is generally not the case. We thus chose 
the strategy of  estimating  rather the ratio of full income shares. We use three equations:  
 
  



++Φ+=
++Φ+=
mmmmmmm
fffffff
eH
eH
Xγ
Xγ
ln
ln
βα
βα
                 (3.6) 
 
and 
  λ+=




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

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Φ
Φ
δX
f
m
ln ,         (3.7) 
 
where δγγ ,,),,,,(
mfmfmf
ββαα  are the parameter vectors; X
f
 and X
m
 are respectively the 
vectors of female and male individual characteristics; ),,,,,( zsX
mfmf
yyww= ; 
mf
ee ,  and 
λ  are the error terms which are assumed to have a joint normal distribution with zero means. 
To this we add the budget constraint: yTww
mfmf
++=Φ+Φ=Φ )(   
Using the sub-sample S
1
 of households who are assumed to share full income equally, 
i.e. here the sub-sample of couples for whom the index value calculated above is 1 (the same 
answer, plus or minus one, to the subjective ladder question), we obtain:  
mf
Φ=Φ = [ ]Π+++ yTww
fm
)(
2
1
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Or, assuming Π to be only small, 
mf
Φ=Φ = [ ]yTww
fm
++ )(
2
1
                 (3.8) 
The system (3.6) can then be estimated using this sub-sample.  
In this first stage the vectors of parameters 
mfmfmf
γγ ,),,,,( ββαα  can be identified. 
Note that the probability mass corresponding to the index value of 1 is continuously 
spread over the interval 
[ ]
2
*
1
*
; kk
ff
−Φ−Φ  rather than being concentrated at the point 
mf
Φ=Φ = [ ]yTww
fm
++ )(21 . Thus for those individuals belonging to the sub-sample S
1
 
the hypothesized equality between partners’ full incomes holds only approximately: we have 
made this choice (see section 2 above) in order to make our formal definition of equality at 
the same time less restrictive and more realistic. According to our interpretation, our measures 
of 
f
Φ  and 
m
Φ  as [ ]yTww
fm
++ )(21  are subject to error, implying that the estimators are 
biased towards zero (Greene, 2000). This bias can be corrected by using the results obtained 
from the ordered probit model.
13
 
Another source of bias is sample selection when we use the sub-sample of couples for 
whom the index value is 1. We correct for this selection bias by using the results from the 
ordered probit model. The method and demonstration are contained in Appendix A. 
 
The vector of parameters 
δ
 is identified in the second stage by estimating (3.7) and 
using the whole sample of households. 
 
 ln
iR += δXˆ          (3.9) 
where ln R
ˆ
 is the predicted logarithm of the ratio between the man’s and the woman’s shares: 
 
                                               
13
 The proof is available from the authors. 
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fffffmmmmm
HHRln βαβα ⋅−−−⋅−−= )()(ˆ XγXγ              (3.10) 
 
and the error term i follows a normal distribution with zero mean: 
 
  
ffmm
eei ββλ // −+=  
Finally the shares 
f
Φ  and 
m
Φ  are calculated using the predicted sharing ratio 
f
m
R
Φ
Φ
=
ˆ
 and 
their sum equalized to (observed) full income: yTww
mfmf
++=Φ+Φ=Φ )( . 
Due to the poor quality of our measure of non-labor income, which cannot be 
individualized correctly in the RLMS data, the latter strategy is followed in the empirical 
analysis. The method of estimation is 3SLS in the first stage and OLS in the second stage. 
 
3.2. The estimation results 
3.2.1. Labor Supply Estimations 
The explanatory variables used in the total labor supply estimations (market plus 
domestic work) are the natural logarithm of the individual’s full income calculated using 
(3.8), individual characteristics (age, age squared, number of years of education), household 
characteristics (number of children, presence of elderly persons, possession of durables such 
as a car, a washing machine etc.), and type and region of housing.  
The dependent variable in the sharing rule equation is the predicted ratio between the 
male and female shares of full income, R
ˆ
. The vector of explanatory variables includes the 
natural logarithms of the wage rates and their squares, and the same individual and household 
characteristics as in section 2. The estimates are reported in Table B (Appendix B). 
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The main results are as follows. The total labor supply of both household members is 
positively correlated with their individual full incomes and is negatively correlated with their 
wage rates. This implies a negative relationship between (true) leisure and wages, which, in 
turn, can be interpreted as incomes being so low that leisure is a very expensive good: the 
substitution effect dominates the income effect. 
 
3.2.2. Restrictions on the Slutsky Matrix 
The Slutsky condition for the labor supply model implies that the wage response of the 
compensated supply of labor is non-negative: 
0≥
∂
∂
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i
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Given the outcomes of the coefficients estimates in Table C (Appendix C), the latter condition 
is satisfied for both female and male labor supply for the whole sample of observations as 
well as at the mean wages, labor supply and full incomes.  
 
3.2.3. Sharing Rule Estimation 
Due to the nonlinearity of the estimated equation in terms of wages, the elasticity of 
the dependent variable with respect to wages is defined by both a constant term and a term 
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which depends on the corresponding wage
14
. The constant term of the sharing ratio elasticity 
with respect to wages is in each case large and significant: -2.93 for women’s wages and 1.65 
for men’s. That is, the direct effect of women’s wages on the sharing ratio is negative, so that 
the effect of women’s wages on the woman’s share is positive, and negative on the men’s 
share. Symmetrically, the direct effect of men’s wages on the sharing ratio is positive, so that 
the effect of male wages on the woman’s share is negative, and the effect on the man’s share 
is positive. The direct effect of women’s wages is stronger than that of men’s wages. This 
finding is consistent with the presence of intra-household bargaining. The elasticities of the 
sharing ratio with respect to both wages calculated at their mean level, are given in Table 7. 
This table also includes the effect of non-labor income and various household characteristics, 
allowing us to compare the size of the effect of the different variables on income sharing. R 
refers to the sharing ratio of full income: R = Φ
m
 /Φ
f
. 
The effect of non-labor income is small and insignificant. However, this result is not 
totally convincing due to the poor quality of the non-labor income variable. The sharing ratio 
increases with the man’s education and is sharply lower if the woman’s level of education is 
higher than her husband’s (although then the latter effect is not significant). Hence, 
differences in education have a large impact on full-income sharing in the household. The 
number of children and of elderly people has a negative impact on this ratio, and hence exerts 
a positive effect on the woman’s share but these effects are not significant. 
 
Table 7. Marginal Effects of Wage Rates and other Explanatory Variables on the 
Sharing Rule (R). 
                                               
14
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1
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2
 are the regression coefficients on the linear and squared 
terms respectively. 
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Marginal Effect (in roubles). 
∂lnR/∂lnw
f
 -0.33*** 
∂lnR/∂lnw
m
 -0.13*** 
∂R/∂w
f
 -0.2*** 
∂R/∂w
m
 -0.005*** 
∂R/y 0 
∂R/∂(Man's age) -0.01 
∂R/∂(Age
f 
– Age
m
) 0.02 
∂R/∂(Years of man’s education) 0.3*** 
∂R/∂(Woman has higher degree) -0.6 
∂R/∂(Number of children 0-7 years old) -0.18 
∂R/∂( Number of children 7-18 years old) -0.13 
∂R/∂( Number of elderly persons in the household) -0.52 
* significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level. 
 
The elasticity as well as the marginal effects of wages show that, at mean wages, the 
sharing ratio falls when the wages of both household members increases. The effect is much 
stronger, though, for women’s wages than for men’s. That is, a raise in any wage benefits 
women more than it does men. However, this effect is much stronger in the case of an 
increase in the woman’s own wages than for an increase in male wages. 
 
3.2.1. Simulating the sharing rule  
The results above can be summarized by a numerical example. Consider an average 
Russian household, represented by a 39-year old woman earning 8 roubles per hour, whose 
husband is 41 years old earning 13 roubles per hour. Assume that they have a 7-year old child 
(or older), that both received 13 years of education, that the family lives in a city in the Urals, 
and that the wave chosen for this exercise is round 7. The variables used in these calculations 
for the shares and transfers refer to monthly incomes.  
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The model yields an estimated probability of 79% that husband and wife report 
equality in the sharing of income as measured by our index, I, with the full incomes of the 
household members amounting to 10920 roubles for the woman and 13156 for the man. 
Now assume that woman’s wages are the same as her husband’s. The probability that 
the wife receives a lower share decreases to 10 % and predicted income sharing approaches 
equality, with a ratio between shares of 1.06. 
A one rouble increase in the woman’s wage rate leads to a slightly less unequal 
sharing of household full income, with 11344 roubles allocated to the wife and 13404 
allocated to the husband. A one rouble increase in the man’s wage rate leads to equal sharing 
of the extra income (about 335 roubles for each partner) with consequently a slightly less 
unequal sharing of full income (11258 for the woman and 13490 for the man). 
Assume now that the family has another child, aged between 7 and 18, then the 
probability of the wife receiving a larger share increases to 10.4% and full income would be 
reallocated with about 1000 roubles passing from husband to wife. The same reallocation is 
predicted if the second child is younger or is replaced by an elderly person. Therefore, the 
presence of children and of elderly persons increases the woman’s bargaining power. 
The wife’s education being higher than her husband’s (for example higher education 
versus technical studies) has a strong effect on the sharing of full income, with the woman 
now receiving 60%. 
The impacts of these various changes on the sharing rule are summarized in Table 8 
below.
 
 
Table 8. Predicted Impact of Various Changes in the Covariates on the Probability of 
Equal Full Income Sharing and on the Shares of the Two Partners 
 
 P0 
(%) 
P1 
(%) 
P2 
(%) 
Φ
f
 Φ
m
 R ∆Φ
f
 ∆Φ
m
 
Control 
11 79 10 10920 13156 1.2   
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∆w
f
 = 1 rouble 
   11344 13404 1.18 424 247 
∆w
m
 = 1 rouble 
   11258 13490 1.198 337 334 
∆ w
f
 = w
f
 - w
m
 
10 79 11 13608 14499 1.06 2688 1343 
A second 
younger child  
10 79 11 11623 12453 1.07 703 -703 
A second older 
child 
9.6 79 11.4 11887 12189 1.03 967 -967 
An elderly 
person 
12 79 9 12063 12012 1 1143 -1143 
Woman’s 
higher degree 
9.5 82 8.5 15097 8978 0.6 4177 -4177 
P0: Probability of the index taking a value of 0 (wife reports being poorer) 
P1: Probability of the index taking a value of 1 (equality) 
P2: Probability of the index taking a value of 2 (wife reports being richer) 
∆Φ
f
: Change in woman’s share. 
∆Φ
m
: Change in man’s share. 
∆w
f
: Woman’s wage rate change with respect to the control value 
∆w
m
: Man’s wage rate change with respect to the control value 
 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS  
In this paper we have proposed an application of the collective model to the analysis 
of intra-household inequality using self-reported income scales. We use a collective model 
taking into account household production. The results support the assumptions of the 
collective model. The wage difference within the household is found to be a strong 
determinant of the intra-household sharing of resources. 
We then set out a new method of identification of the sharing rule. Using the results 
obtained from couples who report the same level of income, and interpreting this as equal 
income-sharing, we are able to identify the sharing rule for the whole sample. The results are 
consistent with those predicted by the model: as expected, wages and education level exert a 
strong influence on the sharing rule, with an increase in female wages increasing women’s 
share more strongly than does an increase in male wages. Perhaps more unexpected is the 
positive effect of children and of elderly persons on the wife’s share. This seems to indicate 
that variables other than those related to market wages or non-labor income can influence 
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intra-household bargaining. Exploring this result further should be the aim of future research, 
from both an empirical as well as a theoretical point of view. 
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APPENDIX A 
The correction term Ratio1 of the selection bias in the labor supply equations is constructed as 
follows: 
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where f(.), F(.) are the standard normal density and cumulative density functions respectively. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
 
Table B. 3SLS Estimation of Woman’s and Man's Total Labor Supply and Sharing 
  Ratio. 
 
 Woman's Total 
Labor Supply 
Man's Total  
Labor Supply 
Ln of Sharing 
Ratio  
 Coefficient Coefficient  Coefficient 
Ln of individual full income (Φ
f
=Φ
m
) 10.2* 9.75* 
 
Ln of woman's wage rate 
-23.7***  
-2.93*** 
Ln of man's wage rate 
 -27*** 
1.65*** 
Ln of woman's wage rate squared   0.58*** 
Ln of man's wage rate squared   -0.36*** 
Non-labor income   -0.005 
    
Woman's age 3.4   
Woman's age squared -3.75   
Man's age  3.15* -0.01 
Man's age squared   -4.7**  
Age difference
a
   0.03 
    
Years of man’s education   0.31*** 
Woman has higher degree of education than man   -0.71 
    
Number of children 0-7 years old 66.7*** 26.12*** -0.12 
Number of children 7-18 years old 27.9*** 7.66*** -0.16 
Number of elderly persons in the household -2.28 1.15 -0.19 
    
Automobile owned 9.47* 19***  
Washing machine owned -5.15 5.81  
    
Rural 14.7* -4.65 0.49 
Moscow - St-Petersburg 7.6 15.5*** 0.08 
Round 5 16.3** 4.76 0.31 
Round 6 -2.96 1.67 0.19 
Round 8 -12.54 -12.42 0.02 
    
Ratio1 86.32* -25.8  
Constant  166.8*** 134** -1.33 
Number of observations 1729 1729 2174 
* significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level. 
             a
 Age difference: the difference between the woman's age and the man's age. 
 The reference categories are: Urban versus Rural, region other than Moscow and St Petersburg, Round 7 for round of 
 observation.  
 Source: RLMS (rounds 5-8) 
 
